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Utilitarianism, Game Theory, and the Social 
Contract 
Daniel Burgess 
 
I. Introduction 
 
One of the long-standing debates in the field of 
ethics has to do with the ethical system of utilitarianism.  
Ethicists have argued for over a century about the 
feasibility, applicability, and the possible results of the 
implementation of such a system.  But this wide-
ranging debate over the entire system of utilitarianism 
often overshadows a debate which exists between 
utilitarians themselves.  Some utilitarians feel that the 
best method of ethics is one which evaluates individual 
actions based upon their consequences.  Others feel that 
utilitarianism should focus on finding and codifying the 
rules which, when universally applied, result in the 
greatest amount of good for the greatest number.  It is 
this debate, the debate between act- and rule-utilitarians, 
which I wish to highlight and expound upon in this 
paper.   
It is well-established by now that any attempt to 
universalize decisions made by purely act-utilitarian 
criteria may have disastrous results,21 and it is not my 
purpose in this paper to rehash generally accepted 
arguments.  However, when confronted with these 
critiques, many act-utilitarians rally around the fact that 
these overall disadvantages in utility caused by the 
universalization of act-utilitarian decisions are 
outweighed by the numerous occasions in which an act-
utilitarian framework produces more desirable 
immediate consequences than does a rule-utilitarian 
                                                
21 Hunter, D.  “Act utilitarianism and dynamic deliberation.”  
Erkenntnis 41 (1994):  11-12. 
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system.22  Though this may be correct in certain cases, I 
will show that in a certain class of cases, act-utilitarian 
decision procedures result in an overall level of utility 
that is far inferior to that which would be achieved 
through the use of a rule-utilitarian decision procedure. 
Through the use of game theory and a game-theoretical 
model of the social contract, I will demonstrate that in 
the class of non-communicative games with multiple 
optimal equilibria, utilization of rule-utilitarian decision 
procedures is actually immediately superior to the use 
of act-utilitarian decision procedures.  I will then 
discuss the importance of games of this type to the field 
of prescriptive ethics as a whole. 
 
I. Definitions 
 
 Before I begin my analysis it is necessary to 
clarify a few terms.  First, by utilitarian I mean a 
person who, when evaluating a choice of possible 
decisions or actions, believes the correct choice to be 
that which will result in the greatest attainment of good 
for the greatest number of people.  In this definition I 
make no claims about what this good should be 
considered to be.  In fact, for the purposes of analysis in 
this paper, what exactly constitutes the good is 
completely irrelevant.  I have used the general term 
happiness, but replacing “happiness” with “pleasure,” 
“satisfied preferences,” or “actualized mental states” 
would cause no inconsistency in my argument.  So long 
as one accepts that there is such a thing as a good which 
we should seek to maximize, my argument remains 
valid. 
 For act- and rule-utilitarianism, I will be using 
the definitions offered by Binmore.  By act-utilitarian I 
                                                
22 Mackie, J. L.  “The disutility of act-utilitarianism.”  
Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1973):  289-300. 
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mean one who “argues that each individual act should 
maximize the common good.”23  By rule-utilitarian I 
mean one who “argues that utilitarian principles should 
be applied to the rules to which we appeal when making 
decisions.” 24   While there are interesting ethical 
disputes about the exact nature of the difference 
between rule-utilitarianism and deontological systems 
of ethics like that of Immanuel Kant, it is not my 
purpose in this paper to discuss the differences between 
deontology and consequentialism.  I am only attempting 
to differentiate between act- and rule-utilitarianism. 
 Finally, game theory is defined as “the study of 
the ways in which strategic interactions among rational 
players produce outcomes with respect to the 
preferences (or utilities) of those players.” 25  
Equilibrium for a particular game is the stable 
combination of choices and subsequent results which 
follow directly from a rational evaluation of the aspects 
of the game based on certain underlying assumptions.  
The only underlying assumptions made in this paper are 
those constraining the decision procedures of the 
players of the game and the predetermined rules of the 
game itself.  A decision procedure is the method by 
which players evaluate what constitutes a beneficial 
outcome of the game.  The two decision procedures 
explored are an act-utilitarian procedure and a rule-
utilitarian procedure.  A strategy is a general theory of 
action stemming from the decision procedure of a 
player.  A strategy is said to be optimal insofar as it 
produces the best possible result.  With that, let the 
games begin! 
 
                                                
23 Binmore, K.  Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 2.  
Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 1998.  p. 161. 
24 Ibid.  p. 161. 
25 “Game theory.”  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Online). 
 76 
II. The Driving Game 
 
For an example of a game which illustrates the 
difference between act- and rule-utilitarian decision 
procedures, let’s stay as simple as possible.  The game 
described below will have but two players, each having 
only two possible choices.  The game is far simpler 
than most such games in the real world, but the 
concepts illustrated within can be extrapolated into 
more complex situations quite easily.  Before we begin 
the game, we have to make certain assumptions about 
its nature.  These assumptions constitute the rules by 
which the game is played: 
1) Both players must use the same decision 
procedure. 
2) Both players are rational decision-makers. 
3) Both players are able to accurately predict the 
outcome of a given combination of actions. 
4) Both players are aware of the first three 
assumptions. 
Tom and Jerry are our two players.  Each one is driving 
toward the other on a road at night, and the road is just 
wide enough for both cars to pass one another safely.  
As the two cars approach one another, each driver has a 
choice:  veer to the left or veer to the right.  The range 
of possible outcomes for this exchange is illustrated by 
the decision matrix below: 
 
Tom 
Right Left 
1 
1 
-5 
Je
rr
y Le
ft 
R
ig
ht
 
-5 
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For the purposes of this diagram, we will measure the 
outcome of the event in terms of the total amount of 
happiness received by the two participants.26  In this 
paper all outcomes will be measured in terms of total 
utility received by all participants of the game without 
reference to the individual levels of utility caused by 
each outcome.  In this case, the pair receives 1 unit of 
happiness either when both participants veer to the left 
or when both participants veer to the right, causing the 
two cars to pass one another without incident.  When 
one participant veers right as the other veers left, 
however, the cars crash, causing a general level of 
unhappiness five times more intense than the happiness 
experienced with an uneventful ride.27 
  
III. Act-utilitarian Decision Procedures 
 
Let us suppose that Tom is an act-utilitarian, which 
means that under assumption 1, so is Jerry.  Tom knows 
that the best possible outcome will come from both 
drivers either choosing left or choosing right, and 
assumes that Jerry will come to this conclusion as well.  
As an act-utilitarian, what should Tom do? 
 The plain and simple truth is that Tom has no 
idea, and neither do we.  This is because the game 
which Tom is playing has multiple equilibria.  If there 
were only one optimal resolution to the game being 
played, Tom would have no trouble choosing the action 
                                                
26 Again, it is important to note that the actual type of “good” 
represented in this matrix is immaterial.  Replace “happiness” with 
“satisfied preferences” and you’ll get the same result. 
27 It could be argued that the decision I have chosen to analyze is 
not a moral one.  It is not my purpose in this paper to debate what 
decisions do and do not constitute morality.  I will simply state that 
it is quite easy to imagine a situation similar to the one described 
above that could be widely recognized as being “moral” in nature, 
and that I have chosen the driving game merely for its simplicity 
and its universality. 
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that would lead to that optimal resolution, and would be 
able to assume that Jerry, a fellow act-utilitarian, would 
do the same.  However, in this game there are two 
optimal solutions, and each solution requires a different 
choice from Tom.  The result of both players choosing 
right is just as good as the result of both players 
choosing left.  If Tom chooses to go right, he faces a ½ 
probability that Jerry will also go right, and that a 
favorable outcome will result.  But he also faces a ½ 
probability that Jerry will choose left, and that a 
thoroughly unfavorable outcome will come about.  The 
same ½-½ ratio results if Tom chooses to go left.  Tom 
has no good reason, as an act-utilitarian, to choose one 
over the other, and neither does Jerry.  If the two 
players could communicate, then there would be a 
chance that the situation could be resolved in a 
mutually beneficial manner.  However, this situation 
precludes the possibility of communication, and each 
participant in the game has to choose based on nothing 
but his rational judgment.  Given that act-utilitarianism 
does not suggest right over left or vice versa, Tom must 
choose, in effect, randomly.  Jerry, being a rational 
agent with the same decision process as Tom, makes 
the same choice.  So the strategy which results from an 
act-utilitarian decision procedure is that both players 
choose randomly.28  So the result for Tom is that half of 
the time he passes Jerry uneventfully, and half of the 
time the two end up exchanging insurance info on the 
side of the road.  Clearly this is problematic.  Not only 
is this not the best possible outcome for the game being 
played, but it is markedly inferior to the actual result of 
this game that we play hundreds of times every day.  In 
this case at least, a strategy stemming from an act-
                                                
28 Binmore, K.  “Reciprocity and the social contract.”  Politics, 
Philosophy & Economics 3 (2004):  7. 
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utilitarian decision procedure produces results that are 
far less than optimal.   
 
IV. Rule-utilitarian Decision Procedures 
 
Let us change things around a bit and assign a 
rule-utilitarian decision procedure to both players.  Just 
as before, Tom enters the game looking for an optimal 
strategy given his decision procedure, and just as before, 
he finds one.  However, the optimal strategy for the 
rule-utilitarian differs greatly from the optimal strategy 
for the act-utilitarian.  Looking at the decision matrix, 
Tom sees that the best outcomes occur when both he 
and Jerry choose the same side.  Included in his 
decision procedure is the caveat that in order for a 
strategy to be optimal, it must be universally applicable 
for this type of situation.  Given this caveat, Tom 
reasons as follows:  if I choose right, then 
universalizing that choice means that Jerry must choose 
right.  And if we both choose to veer right then we miss 
each other and the best possible solution comes about.  
Tom therefore comes to the conclusion that the rule 
“always choose right,” becomes the optimal strategy 
because its universalization means that Jerry must 
follow it as well.  He is correct to reason that “always 
choose right” is the optimal strategy for this particular 
game.  If this optimal strategy is followed by both 
players, then no accidents ever occur between the two 
and a far better overall outcome is achieved than that 
which follows from act-utilitarian reasoning. 
However, there are still problems with the rule-
utilitarian decision procedure that Tom utilizes.  
Remember that one of the restrictions to this class of 
games is that the two players cannot communicate.  
Because of this fact, Tom has to make a very suspect 
leap when deducing the optimal strategy for this game.  
He has to assume that Jerry will also come to the 
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conclusion that “always choose right” is the rule to 
follow.  However, given that this game has multiple 
equilibria, this is not always the case.  A rule which 
may appear just as attractive to Jerry as “always choose 
right” is the rule “always choose left.”  Jerry may 
reason that the universalization of this second rule 
would also lead to no crashes between the two players, 
which is the best possible outcome.  What happens 
when the two players decide to model their strategies 
after different but equally optimal rules?  In this case, 
the two players will always crash, which is an even 
worse outcome than that offered through an act-
utilitarian analysis of the game.  So in the end, unless 
something about the game is changed, the Nash 
equilibrium for the two games is exactly the same.  Half 
of the time the two rule-utilitarian players will both 
choose either “always choose left” or “always choose 
right” as their rule, but the other half of the time they 
will choose opposite rules to universalize.  So, just like 
act-utilitarians, rule-utilitarians will crash half of the 
time if not allowed to communicate.  Something more 
is needed before we can call rule-utilitarianism a true 
optimal strategy.  Tom must have a reasonable 
expectation that Jerry will choose the same optimal 
strategy before Tom’s implementation of this strategy 
will eliminate all crashes. 
This reasonable expectation cannot be arrived at 
through discussion, as the game is rigged so that the 
two players cannot discuss what choice the other is 
going to make.  However, it can be arrived at through 
other means. 
 
V. The Social Contract 
 
My contention is that this situation can be 
resolved in an optimal manner by an appeal to the 
social contract.  The particular form of contractarianism 
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to which I am referring is not the more traditional view 
ascribed to Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, but rather 
the more recent 20th-century conception espoused by 
John C. Harsanyi and John Rawls.  Both Harsanyi and 
Rawls argue for an idea of the social contract as 
stemming from a rational agreement by the interested 
parties.  Both Rawls and Harsanyi argued that behind a 
“veil of ignorance,” a rational agent would agree to 
cede power to a government given that the methods of 
distribution used by the government were consistent 
with a rational principle.  Rawls felt that this rational 
principle was the “maximin principle,” while Harsanyi 
argued for a “preference utilitarianism principle.” 29  
Both principles have been critiqued at length in the 
philosophical literature, and my purpose in this paper is 
not to debate the merits of one principle over another.  
Rather, I wish to suggest that the social contract can 
more adequately be framed within the contexts of game 
theory and utilitarianism.  My thinking in this area is 
similar to that of Ken Binmore: 
 
I think game theory has two major lessons for a putative 
science of moral behavior.  The first is that a social 
contract can be usefully understood as the set of 
commonly understood conventions that allow the 
citizens of a society to coordinate on one of the many 
equilibria in their game of life.  The second is that…a 
much wider range of behavior [is] supported as an 
equilibrium in repeated games than is generally 
thought.”30 
 
                                                
29 Weirich, P.  “A Game-theoretic comparison of the utilitarian and 
maximin rules of social choice.”  Erkenntnis 28 (1988):  117-133; 
Harsanyi, J. C.  “Rule utilitarianism and decision theory.”  
Erkenntnis 11 (1977):  25-53. 
30 Binmore, K.  “Reciprocity and the social contract.”  Politics, 
Philosophy & Economics 3 (2004):  5-6. 
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If we view the human experience as the sum total of a 
number of different games that we play each and every 
day, then the social contract functions effectively as a 
means of suggesting the correct outcomes of those 
games.  When a game, such as that outlined above, has 
multiple equilibria, it is the purpose of the social 
contract to mediate between the two competing 
equilibria and promote one over the other.  This can 
happen in a wide number of ways.  When the game 
being played is of little significance in the grand 
scheme of things, the social contract may manifest itself 
in the form of social conventions or habits.  However, 
when an improper conclusion to the game being played 
may jeopardize the safety or life of the participants, it 
becomes necessary for someone to forcibly implement 
the social contract.  This usually comes in the form of 
laws issued and enforced by the government.  The 
purpose of the government, then, is to firmly establish 
those rules to be followed by citizens which will result 
in the greatest number of fulfilled equilibria for the 
various dangerous games that we play.  These rules are 
by no means set in stone, and may be changed if doing 
so would allow the participants in the game of life to 
fulfill more or greater equilibria. 
 
VI. The Driving Game Revisited 
 
Clearly, the game of driving is one in which a 
dangerous outcome is probable without the proper rules 
being followed.  Given that, we can utilize this game-
theoretical approach to the social contract to ensure that 
one of the two possible optimal equilibria in the game is 
universalized.  In America, we universalize the rule of 
“always choose right.”  Of course, in other countries, 
such as Britain, the rule “always choose left,” is 
universalized.  The specific rule which is universalized 
is immaterial; what is important is that the participants 
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of the game understand what rule is to be universalized 
and have a reasonable expectation that other players 
will choose to follow the same rule as they do.  
Assuming that the driving game mentioned above is 
being played in America, Tom now has a reasonable 
expectation that Jerry will choose to follow the state-
mandated rule of “always choose right.”  Given that this 
is the rule which he can reasonably expect Jerry to 
universalize, Tom now chooses to universalize “always 
choose right” as well.  The end result of the game with 
the addition of this contractarian assumption is that the 
best possible outcome will now almost always occur, 
and that the rule-utilitarian approach yields preferable 
results.   
However, one could point out that the changes 
we have enacted in the revisited driving game are just 
as applicable to act-utilitarianism as to rule-
utilitarianism. However, there is a fundamental problem 
in applying the constraints listed above to a system in 
which all the players are act-utilitarian.  Recall that one 
of the advantages of a social contract listed above is 
that the participants of the game have a reasonable 
expectation that other players will choose to follow the 
same rule as they do.  There is no inconsistency in 
applying this maxim to a game in which all participants 
are rule-utilitarians, because, by the very definition of 
rule-utilitarianism, every rule-utilitarian will follow 
those rules which he or she knows will produce the 
optimal outcome when universally applied, regardless 
of the circumstances of the game.  An act-utilitarian has 
no such restriction.  Perhaps the most fundamental 
difference between an act-utilitarian and a rule-
utilitarian is that the act-utilitarian is free to break a rule 
which is most beneficial when universally applied, 
whenever the act-utilitarian deems it to be in the best 
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interest of all people involved to break the rule. 31  
Given this fundamental difference between act-
utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism, it is my contention 
that act-utilitarianism is incompatible with the form of 
the social contract outlined above because in a system 
in which all participants are act-utilitarian, there can be 
no reasonable certainty that a player will follow the rule 
necessary for the optimal resolution of the game, and 
because the players will not always choose the optimal 
strategy.  Because no such inconsistency exists when all 
players utilize rule-utilitarian strategies, that system of 
ethics is optimal in games of this type. 
It could (and has) been argued that given the 
simplicity of the game I have set up, there is no possible 
reason for an act-utilitarian to stray from conventional 
driving behavior because there is no reason to believe 
that doing so would be to anyone’s benefit.  To this I 
respond that, while this is the case in the simplest of 
games, it is easy to imagine a slightly more complex 
game for which this is not true.  For example, let’s put 
both Tom and Jerry at a bar.  Both of them are 
convinced that they can consume vast amounts of 
alcohol in order to have a smashingly good time 
without this affecting their motor skills in any way.  
Needless to say, they are incorrect.  A rule-utilitarian 
would immediately recognize that the optimal strategy 
in this game is to refrain from drinking.  An act-
utilitarian could quite easily reason that the universal 
rule of “don’t drink and drive” is optimal when applied 
to everyone, but could also conclude that he is an 
exception due to his tolerance.  Given this, in the more 
complex game described above, act-utilitarian Tom will 
                                                
31 See Carlson, G.  “Plans, expectations, and act-utilitarian 
distrust.”  Philosophical Studies 36 (1979):  295-300; Freedman, B.  
“A meta-ethics for professional morality.”  Ethics 89 (1978): 1-19; 
Lyons, D.  Forms and limits of utilitarianism.  Oxford, UK:  
Clarendon Press, 1965. 
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not always follow the optimal strategy, and can have no 
certainty that act-utilitarian Jerry will follow the 
optimal strategy either.  In this case, then, the social 
contract as defined above and a prescriptive act-
utilitarian system of ethics are incompatible. 
 
VII. Objections 
 
The most obvious objection to the situation 
present above deals with the restrictions placed upon 
the actors.  Specifically, the driving game as was 
framed above greatly confined the players’ knowledge 
and opportunities for cooperation by prohibiting them 
from communicating.  In real life, one might argue, we 
are not prevented from communicating from those with 
whom we play games.  We can talk to them and discuss 
which set of choices might result in the best overall 
outcome.  Therefore, while the driving example above 
might be illustrative of a given case, this case is rare 
and contrived enough that the arguments applicable in 
this situation are not applicable to the entirety of the 
range of choices available to members of a society. 
I am willing to concede that the above situation 
is a particular case, but it belongs to a class of cases 
which I feel have a great deal of importance in the field 
of prescriptive ethics.  Because of the vastness of our 
cities, the increasing influence of mass media, and the 
growing world population, it is becoming more and 
more difficult every day to have meaningful 
interactions with those with whom we do not already 
have a prior relationship.  The important point here is 
not that the above class of games relates only to those 
cases in which it is impossible to communicate with the 
others playing, but also to those cases in which it is 
infeasible to do so.  Every day we are confronted by a 
multitude of situations in which we could take the time 
to communicate with other actors in order to mutually 
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consent to the best possible combination of actions, but 
we choose not to because of constraints upon our time 
and resources.  The game of driving is but one of the 
situations in which an optimal outcome could be arrived 
at through cooperative deliberation; however, in this 
game and in many others we defer to rules to save time, 
because no one wants to spend their driving time 
shouting out directions to every other person on the 
road.  Life is filled with situations of this type, and rule-
utilitarianism, when conjoined with a game-theoretic 
model of the social contract, can ensure that the optimal 
equilibria to the many impersonal games that we play 
everyday will occur.   
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
My goal in this paper was to offer a selective 
refutation of the argument that application of an act-
utilitarian decision procedure to an individual situation 
will necessarily result in an optimal result.  It is my 
belief that a more wide-sweeping refutation of this 
argument is possible given unlimited space in which to 
present ideas; however, given the restricted length of 
this paper, I chose to focus upon a single class of games 
to which this argument cannot apply.  Through an 
analysis of the specific class of non-communicative, 
multiple-equilibria games, it is apparent that oftentimes 
an act-utilitarian decision procedure is markedly 
inferior to a rule-utilitarian decision procedure in terms 
of the strategies suggested by each approach.  However, 
in order for rule-utilitarianism to truly prescribe an 
optimal strategy for the player of the game, a neo-
contractarian position such as the one offered by 
Binmore is necessary to ensure the preferability of one 
of a number of equally optimal equilibria.  Applied to 
the “game of life,” it is my belief that further 
implementation of this approach to prescriptive ethics 
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may shed light upon and serve to improve those rules 
which best promote the happiness of society as a whole.  
